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 ‘ASSISTED’ FACIAL RECOGNITION AND THE REINVENTION 
OF SUSPICION AND DISCRETION IN DIGITAL POLICING
Pete Fussey, Bethan Davies and Martin Innes*
Automated facial recognition (AFR) has emerged as one of the most controversial policing in-
novations of recent years. Drawing on empirical data collected during the United Kingdom’s two 
major police trials of AFR deployments—and building on insights from the sociology of policing, 
surveillance studies and science and technology studies—this article advances several arguments. 
Tracing a lineage from early sociologies of policing that accented the importance of police discretion 
and suspicion formation, the analysis illuminates how technological capability is conditioned by 
police discretion, but police discretion itself is also contingent on affordances brought by the oper-
ational and technical environment. These, in turn, frame and ‘legitimate’ subjects of a reinvented 
and digitally mediated ‘bureaucratic suspicion’.
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Introduction
Automated facial recognition (AFR) surveillance has emerged as a particularly contro-
versial technology among the growing armoury of digital policing tools. This reflects 
how AFR engages several longstanding dilemmas affecting the execution of social con-
trol: those of identification, suspicion and discretion. In particular, questions of identi-
fication and linking individuals to bureaucratic traces held about them and their past 
behaviours have constituted defining and elemental challenges. As Cole (2002) attests, 
accomplishing this linkage has been a significant ‘driver’ of innovation in the conduct 
of surveillance and forensic science. For example, fingerprinting has its origins in 19th 
century India, as colonial institutions sought to individuate members of the population 
they were attempting to administer. More recently, Innes et  al. (2020) describe how 
certain neighbourhood policing officers acquire ‘cop cultural capital’ through their 
ability to identify ‘on sight’ members of street gangs and to have knowledge of their 
patterns of behaviour and association.
This identification imperative underpins the development trajectories and oper-
ational adoption of some of the most significant and controversial social control tech-
nologies. Included here are the rapid growth of biometrics, such as the UK National 
DNA Database, as well as the proliferation of visual surveillance technologies (inter 
alia Marx 2016). Advancing this momentum have been recent manoeuvres to integrate 
AFR technologies into the routines and processes of policing as part of the wider and 
growing movements in ‘digital policing’ and its ‘biometrification’. AFR is especially 
intriguing because of how it blends and amalgamates the principles of both visual and 
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biometric surveillance. As a consequence, it has proven highly controversial, with sig-
nificant political and legal challenges mounted with respect to several ‘early adopter’ 
policing applications.
An aspect of these challenges resides in deep-rooted normative formations of 
suspicion that reflect how surveillance is routinely steered towards segments of the 
population that Reiner (1992) dubbed ‘police property’. Indeed, it was arguably the 
seminal finding of the early sociological ethnographies of street policing that the po-
lice ‘gaze’, and decisions to intervene via the enactment of criminal law, were not 
uniformly distributed (Dixon 1997). The tenor of these arguments were synthesized 
in Matza’s (1969) differentiation between ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘incidental’ suspicion. 
The latter pivots around the archetypal crimefighter myth of police work, whereby 
the skilled investigator determines ‘whodunit’ by linking aspects of the incident to a 
suspect with the means, motive and opportunity to commit the offence (Innes 2003). 
Whilst this may be the favoured fictional representation of police crime investigation 
work, according to research, it is relatively infrequent. Far more routine is ‘bureau-
cratic suspicion’ involving rounding up the ‘usual suspects’ (Gill 2000), where police 
search strategies are based upon knowledge of individuals previously displaying forms 
of criminal behaviour similar to the incident under investigation. This schema was 
notably elaborated by Marx’s (1988) notion of ‘categorical suspicion’, whereby sus-
pect identification becomes based upon specific socio-demographic characteristics. 
He identifies this as especially important to remote surveillance camera practices, a 
view enriched through detailed work by Norris and Armstrong (1999) who concluded 
that operators possessed considerable discretion in determining ‘suitable’ subjects for 
the surveillant gaze.
Discretion thus constitutes another concept of fundamental concern here that, along 
with suspicion, was similarly excavated by the ground-breaking police ethnographies 
of the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Skolnick (1966) concluded that officers on the 
street almost irrevocably possessed determinative decision-making power in terms of 
against whom, when, how and why criminal law was enforced. Collectively, these in-
sights and evidence convey that processes of police surveillance and identification are 
influenced by multiple influences.
These concerns remain central to current debates over efforts to harness digital AFR 
technologies for contemporary policing. Supporters of AFR extol its virtues in aiding 
austerity-afflicted law enforcement agencies identify wanted suspects. To date, two UK 
police forces—South Wales Police (SWP) and the London Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS)—have undertaken the world’s first long-term public multisite trials of this tech-
nology. In response, these initiatives have induced a chorus of opposition that ap-
proached a crescendo during 2019. In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Right 
to Privacy criticized SWP’s use of the technology on the grounds of necessity and pro-
portionality (UN OHCHR 2018). During July 2019, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee (2019) called for authorities to halt its use, pending the 
creation of specific regulations. Summer 2019 also saw the first major legal challenge 
against AFR. Whilst the judicial review upheld that police use was lawful, the Court 
of Appeal overturned parts of this judgement in August 2020, ruling that the current 
legal basis for AFR was insufficient. Crucially for the analysis presented in this article, 
the court highlighted the presence of excessive police discretion over who becomes 
targeted for surveillance and where the camera systems are deployed. This emphasis 
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on discretion is central to the empirically informed analysis presented below, wherein 
the article identifies a wider range and scope of discretionary practices than acknow-
ledged by the court.
In this article, we explicitly set aside these normative and ethical debates to focus 
upon how AFR is operationalized in support of street policing. We draw upon data de-
rived from unprecedented access to these two trial studies to interrogate police uses 
of AFR. Central to our account is how these operational deployments pivot around a 
digital reinvention of bureaucratic suspicion and reformulation of discretion invoked 
by the system and its users. This is important given it contests a more technologic-
ally deterministic discourse surrounding AFR promoted through some press and pol-
itical commentary. The picture emerging from our high-resolution case studies is that, 
rather than AFR being a purely algorithmically driven machine, its use constitutes 
a socio-technical assemblage that both shapes police practices yet is also profoundly 
shaped by forms of police suspicion and discretion. Consequently, we argue that AFR 
should be reframed as ‘assisted’ rather than ‘automated’ facial recognition.
The next section outlines AFR technology, situating this in wider literatures on po-
licing, surveillance and technology. This is followed by an account of how the data 
were collected by the two projects and then synthesized for purposes of analysis and 
reporting. Discussion of the findings starts with an overview of the outcomes achieved 
in order to set out the roles AFR performs in a policing context. These results are then 
interpreted and unpacked by introducing a series of ‘operator’, ‘organisational’ and 
‘system’ issues that account for these outcomes. To help make sense of these data, they 
are next brought alongside the concepts of discretion and suspicion outlined above. 
The concluding section reprises key tenets of the argument, considering their wider 
applicability to the conduct of digital policing and the work of contemporary social 
control technologies.
Situating Facial Recognition Technologies
Facial recognition technology involves real-time biometric1 processing of captured 
video images for the purposes of matching to a database and identifying individuals.2 
For police uses analysed herein, faces of members of the public are scanned as they pass 
fixed and mobile camera points. These images are then analysed by a facial recognition 
algorithm that deciphers a subject’s facial dimensions, typically focusing on the size 
and relationship between individual features (such as shape of the eye socket, distance 
between eyes, shape of the jaw, and so on). More advanced systems use digital mod-
elling to compensate for low light, lens distortion or faces tilted away from cameras. 
This computational code is then matched to a database containing similarly processed 
images (colloquially dubbed a ‘watchlist’) that also contains text-based data, such as 
1The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and companion EU Law Enforcement Directive both define facial im-
ages as biometric data.
2Facial recognition technologies have many forms and applications. This paper focuses on technology that monitors the 
public as they traverse observed areas and compares their faces to a database of known suspects (sometimes called ‘live facial 
recognition’). In the United States, face recognition technology adopts a more investigative role, where surveillance camera, 
social media or other video footage is analysed after an offence has occurred. Here, suspects are unknown to police in advance. 
The other widespread use is for ‘verification’ (as opposed to ‘identification’), such as that used at borders to confirm traveller 
identities. Each application holds different uses, rights implications and demands on human discretion.
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ethnicity code and warrant information. If the algorithm detects a ‘possible match’,3 an 
alert is sent to a human operator for review. If the alert is deemed credible, this stimu-
lates an attempt to engage the matched individual. Overall, while AFR is demonstrably 
technological in character, human interpretation and intervention constitute key parts 
of the policing process.
While it has become increasingly familiar through applications, such as passport con-
trol and Apple’s integration within their iPhone, facial recognition technology actually 
has a surprisingly long history. For Gates (2011), NEC’s first public demonstration of 
the technology at the 1970 World’s Fair Osaka marked a key moment in its biography.4 
While the technology had greater success in capturing the public’s imagination than 
their faces, computational limitations have not prevented experimentation with AFR 
in civic spaces across the world. Several small-scale experiments with AFR technology 
arose in the United Kingdom and United States, including deployments in the London 
Borough of Newham during the 1990s, reportedly in response to perceived resurgent 
threats from Irish Republican terrorism (Fussey 2010). Demonstrating the linkages be-
tween large sporting events and expansions in advanced surveillance architecture, a 
prototype version was trialled at Manchester City’s former Maine Road stadium during 
the mid-1990s (Davies 1996) and in Tampa, FL, during the 2001 Superbowl (Stanley 
and Steinhardt 2002). Notable about all of these attempts is that the technology was 
subsequently abandoned due to poor performance. Such failings also contributed to 
the technology being rejected by 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics planners at the 
height of post-9/11 security anxieties (Fussey and Coaffee 2012).
Accordingly, police engagements with AFR have, until recently, remained small scale 
and episodic. This has left the technology relatively underexamined by surveillance 
scholars, particularly when compared to the attention lavished on other instruments, 
such as CCTV and the bulk monitoring of online activity. Notwithstanding academic 
commentary on the wider topic (inter alia Introna and Wood 2004; Gates 2011), police 
operational uses of AFR technology have yet to be studied empirically. This article 
addresses this gap whilst aspiring to avoid the risk of technological determinism fa-
cing the study of surveillance technology (Lyon 2001) by accenting the role of human 
interpretation and intervention.5 To achieve this, three intersecting literatures are 
considered particularly important for understanding the socio-technical practices sur-
rounding AFR use: sociological studies of police suspicion and discretion; analyses of 
surveillance and society and insights from science and technology studies. These are 
briefly considered in turn.
The ‘discovery’ of discretion in police decision-making during the 1960s and 
1970s opened important questions over how police powers are enacted (Dixon 1997). 
Delivering formal social control was revealed as grounded in finely grained officer 
judgements influenced by myriad factors, including, e.g., the values and precepts of ‘cop 
culture’ and various heuristic ‘easing behaviours’. Related scholarship was brought to-
gether most completely in Davis’ (1971) analysis of injustices and inconsistencies arising 
from police discretion. Although Davis’ key contribution emphasizes harms caused by 
3This terminology has been introduced by SWP in the period since the Cardiff University evaluation.
4In a point of historical continuity, NEC developed the algorithms supporting the face recognition technology used in both 
police trials analysed in this paper.
5Recent legislation has established a requirement for retaining meaningful human decision-making amid algorithmic po-
licing processes (e.g. The Data Protection Act 2018; EU GDPR and companion Law Enforcement Directive).
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licentious uses of discretion, particularly intriguing is the analysis of how such judge-
ments relate to the legal and regulatory structures governing policing. Such structures 
not only frame and constrain subjective action but also create spaces for new forms of 
police discretion to flourish. While Davis’ formulation has proved durable, social sci-
entists have challenged the excessive significance given to the law in this and related 
socio-legal theories (e.g. Dworkin 1977), pointing to a range of different shaping and 
structuring processes affecting the application of police discretion (Campbell 1999). As 
detailed below, to these we add the role of technology in shaping and framing police 
discretion.
If the concept of discretion addressed how police interacted with citizens when 
deciding whether to operationalize legal powers, the invocation of suspicion framed 
who was subject to such encounters and why, appended to which was work on the or-
ganizational construction of suspicion rehearsed above (see also Manning 1978). More 
recent scholarship has provided particular nuance to this debate. Drawing inspiration 
from Goffman’s (1972) microstudies in public order, Quinton (2011) highlights the role 
of tacit knowledge in structuring suspicion. Although often deemed unquantifiable 
by its possessors, Quinton’s analysis identifies a discernible bearing of contextual cues, 
‘backstage’ stereotyping and practical rules of thumb on the formulation of suspicion.
AFR technology nuances suspicion in important ways. It draws elements of recognition 
into deliberations of suspicion. To some extent, this reflects established legal grounds 
for suspicion, such as those coded in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, whereby 
recognition may constitute grounds for stop and search. Yet, an important difference 
arises when AFR technology is inserted into the process. Namely, initial recognition 
does not originate from the officer exercising discretion. Instead, officers act more 
akin to intermediaries, interpreting and then acting upon a (computer instigated) sug-
gestion originating outside of, and prior to, their own intuition. The technology thus 
performs a framing and priming role in how suspicion is generated.
One point of convergence in this wider literature is the linkages between surveil-
lance, risk and discretion drawn by Ericson and Haggerty (1997). Particularly relevant 
for this study of advanced AFR surveillance is Ericson and Haggerty’s emphasis upon 
how routine policing practices encode, communicate and give visibility to specific ren-
derings of risk. Several empirical questions arise concerning operational uses of AFR. 
These include how operators’ risk judgements become framed by information brought 
to their attention by the computer, the impact on ensuing operational judgements, 
the dynamic nature of human–computer interaction and how this affects levels of risk 
appetite and, thus, willingness to intervene. Important here is how appetites escalate 
and de-escalate according to numbers of AFR alerts, themselves an artefact of how the 
machine is calibrated and configured.
The conduct of surveillance has been a significant and rapidly expanding sub-theme 
in the general literature on social control over the past two decades. One theoretical 
touchstone has been Foucault’s (1977) panoptic frame as a particular manifestation of 
intricate intertwinings of power and knowledge. Work in this tradition has captured 
how the surveillance net has both widened and deepened through the incorporation of 
increasingly sophisticated technological apparatus for (self-)monitoring facets of iden-
tity and behaviour. Critical scholars have variously censured the over-literal and often 
incorrect application of the panoptic metaphor (e.g. Bauman and Lyon 2013; Marx 
2016). The panopticon metaphor also emphasizes the self-regulatory experiences of 
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the surveilled rather than the activities of surveyors that constitute the focus herein. 
However, less acknowledged is the continued relevance of disciplinary power in the con-
text of Foucault’s other works, notably emphasis on multiscalar articulations of power 
during his major project on biopolitics (Foucault 2008). Additionally, and as a prepara-
tory staging post for his wider project on governmentality, Foucault (2007) problem-
atized the issue of circulation, a concept that may find resonance for contemporary 
biometric surveillance strategies as they variously permit and prohibit movements of 
populations through spaces.
Recent years have seen Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) concept of the surveillant as-
semblage—itself drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) formulation—gain influ-
ence in this field. The assemblage concept accents the positive magnetism drawing 
different surveillance systems together into powerful upscaled ensembles of observa-
tion techniques. Such accounts have been important in detailing the nuanced ways 
surveillance technologies interrelate with other technological systems to accumulate 
greater potency. Informed by such theoretical contributions, advanced surveillance sys-
tems cannot be seen to function in isolation or, even, at one specific register of oper-
ation. Instead, it has become increasingly necessary to recognize the interoperability of 
different technological architectures, such as the linkages of biometric scanning with 
databases of individuals and their analysis through complex algorithmic techniques. 
Yet, such digital configurations beg important questions over what remains of human 
agency and intervention.
In engaging with such matters, this article takes a cue from a tradition long insti-
tuted in science and technology studies concerning the agentic qualities of technology. 
Stated simply, this holds that, while practitioners shape and condition the application 
and potential of their technological instruments, these practices, forms of action and 
ways of thinking are simultaneously shaped and conditioned by these technologies and 
the affordances they bring (inter alia Latour 1987). This approach induced a field of 
study investigating how the form, meaning and outcomes of a technology are shaped 
as it passes through social settings (Bijker and Law 1992). One theoretical advance 
emerging from this field particularly germane to this paper is Hutchby’s (2001) novel 
application of Gibson’s (1977) ‘affordance theory’. Affordances emphasize how ob-
jects invite certain (inter)actions and generate particular conditions of possibility. As 
explained by MacKenzie et al. (2017: 736): ‘the vital quality of affordances is the oppor-
tunity for action’.
Applied to AFR use, the concept of affordances illuminates how its outcomes are 
not determined by specific technological properties but the opportunities for action 
it provides (and denies) users. How officers engage with these opportunities con-
stitutes the focus for this paper. It is also here, the way AFR technology frames and 
invites opportunities for action, that we make a link to bureaucratic suspicion. As 
noted above, traditional sociologies of policing recognize how bureaucratic suspicion 
structures officer decision-making processes in specific ways. This paper interrogates 
the complex ways affordances of AFR technology scaffold police suspicion in the in-
formation age. Face scanning processing power operates at rates exceeding human 
capability and induces new conditions of policing possibility. These, in turn, assert 
hitherto unexplored influences of technology on discretion and suspicion formation 
within policing.
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Data Collection and Analysis
Following the established traditions of the sociology of policing outlined above, the 
concepts and insights developed here are informed by detailed ‘high resolution’ field-
work. Findings emerge from two independent academic reviews of police AFR tech-
nology in the United Kingdom. Researched AFR deployments spanned 12 events in the 
SWP force area between June 2017 and March 2018 and a more episodic ten deploy-
ments by the MPS between August 2016 and February 2019.6 The two evaluative studies 
were conducted separately and independently. It was only after completing the bulk of 
data collection that the authors were able to compare and contrast their results. The 
fact that the two separate studies illuminated similar issues and themes enhanced the 
evidential strength of the principal claims and justified the attempt to blend the find-
ings. This article is the result.
On the grounds that different kinds of data would afford deeper insights into the 
nuances and complexities of AFR in policing contexts, both studies collected empir-
ical data using multiple-method research designs. Ethnographic observations and 
interviews were the principal methods at both sites. This involved being stationed in 
surveillance vans observing how police operators engaged with AFR technology, with 
most emphasis placed on how officers interpreted and responded to computer-issued 
matches of suspects. Detailed and extensive conversations with police staff also took 
place during these long observation periods. Observations were carried out at seven 
SWP deployments, totalling 35 hours. As SWP usually deployed AFR in multiple sites, 
researchers moved around the relevant locations while observing. For the MPS com-
ponent, observations were conducted at six live operations (single location each time), 
totalling over 50 hours, with additional observations of pre-operational briefings, post-
operational de-briefings and key operational planning meetings.
Data on numbers of AFR-generated alerts (or ‘possible matches’) were analysed at 
both research sites. In Wales, a quantitative analysis of system outputs (CSV files) and op-
erator logs, provided by police, was carried out. There were fewer computer-generated 
alerts in London. Here, outcomes were manually logged by researchers in situ and veri-
fied with police evaluation teams in follow-up meetings. These data indicate how many 
correct (and incorrect) alerts were generated by the technology, how human operators 
viewed the credibility of computational alerts and the outcomes of such deliberations.7 
Taken together, these engagements with the two policing agencies trialling AFR sys-
tems offered a rare opportunity to trace the deployment of technologies through sen-
sitive operational environments.
AFR-equipped surveillance vans were typically stationed at key busy locations, such 
as the main entrance gate to the Principality Stadium in Cardiff or a thoroughfare 
leading to Leicester Square in London. Two operators were normally allocated to each 
van, along with a street-based intervention team usually comprising several police offi-
cers. While the MPS used one vehicle, three vans were usually deployed at larger events 
in Wales, such as the 2017 Champions League final in Cardiff.
6Other smaller-scale UK police AFR activities include a joint one-off MPS–Humberside Police trial (utilizing MPS technical 
capability and counted by them as one of ‘their’ trials) and Greater Manchester Police’s short-lived collaboration with the 
Trafford Centre shopping mall in Manchester. Both occurred during summer 2018.
7Due to data quality issues in operator logbooks used in Wales, slight differences exist between the outcome data of SWP 
and the evaluators. SWP logbooks have now been modified to account for this and are now specifically designed for AFR use.
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Regarding data analysis, qualitative thematic analysis of the observational and inter-
view data revealed extensive conceptual themes. This included those of interest for the 
purposes of the original evaluations, as well as those dissected below. Regarding what 
is reported herein, thematic and data selections were based upon intensive discussions 
between the authors over a period of several months. This iterative process progres-
sively distilled the focus of this article.
AFR and its Outcomes
Political and media-based discussions of AFR have been largely pre-occupied with out-
comes and ‘if it works’. But this position fails to define what appropriate measures of 
success should be (i.e. the number of convictions, arrests or accurate identifications or 
minimizing the volume of inaccurate ‘matches’). For AFR critics, a key issue concerns 
purported high numbers of ‘false positives’ generated by the system. This refers to 
when the AFR algorithm suggests a ‘possible match’ that is inaccurate. This is counter-
pointed by the ‘true positive’ category (a correct match) and ‘false negative’ (when the 
system fails to identify a suspect).
Tables 1 and 2 below list quantitative results from deployments of AFR by SWP and 
the MPS. The columns provide a sense of how the systems were deployed, the size of 
each watchlist and numbers of computer-generated alerts alongside ‘true positive’ out-
comes. Crucially, these outcomes were significantly influenced by the activities of police 
operators. The first table includes data on officer judgements of computer-generated 
AFR matches in Wales.8
While officers may judge algorithmically generated alerts as credible, a further ques-
tion arises over whether these individuals were right to agree with the computer. In 
Table 1 Results from SWP deployments from 31 May 2017 to 7 March 2018
Event Date Watchlist 
size
Alerts Number of AFR matches 
deemed credible by 
human observers (%)
Champions League 31 May 2017–3 June 2017 1,049 
(average)
2,632 78 (3%)
Elvis Festival (Porthcawl) 22 September 2017–23 
September 2017
472 18 11 (61%)
Operation Fulcrum 18 October 2017 616 20 9 (45%)
Anthony Joshua Boxing 28 October 2017 609 60 5 (9%)
Autumn Rugby Internationals 
(four dates)
11 November 2017–2 
December 2017
628–1,262 91 13 (14%)
Kasabian concert 4 December 2017 442 7 3 (43%)
Liam Gallagher concert 13 December 2017 41 6 6 (100%)
Operation Fulcrum 21 December 2017 920 10 8 (80%)
Operation Malacite 22 December 2017 923 3 3 (100%)
Royal visit 18 January 2018 9 0 –
Six Nations Rugby (three dates) 3 February 2018–17 
March 2018
801–873 48 22 (46%) 
Stereophonics concert 7 March 2018 576 5 0 (0%)
8The Champions League operation was disproportionate in terms of the number of false positives for reasons explored in 
more detail below.
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other words, did officers cede discretion to a computer judgement that turned out to be 
wrong? It was possible to explore this issue further in London, where AFR was deployed 
in single locations and evaluators could be present at all times. Below, instances of of-
ficer agreement with computer-generated matches are additionally compared against 
data on street-based checks to confirm a subject’s identity. For example, at Soho (1), 
three possible matches from the AFR system were deemed correct by operators, but 
when IDs were checked, one proved to be correct.
Across both sets of data, results follow no particular pattern. They are mixed in terms 
of their accuracy, with some deployments yielding higher error rates in possible matches 
than others. SWP uses of AFR showed some system improvement over time where, pro-
portionally, the number of correct matches improved (from the original 3 per cent). In 
London, one striking finding is the tendency of officers to agree with (cede discretion 
to) the algorithm and the high chance that computer-generated matches would not be 
verifiably correct.9
However, depicting the policing outcomes of AFR solely in such terms is of limited 
utility. Such figures, and their representation through terminology of ‘true’ and ‘false 
positives’ and ‘negatives’ appropriated from computer science, lack the context needed 
to interpret their implications, particularly for suspicion. For example, algorithms were 
upgraded in the middle of the South Wales trial significantly improving system ac-
curacy, something invisible when considering the figures in isolation. The following 
passages unpack some of the complexities and nuances that shape decision-making 
around AFR practices. Specifically, analysis attends to the multitude of factors impacting 
and interacting with AFR use and their implications for police officers’ constructions 
of suspicion and discretion. Broadly speaking, we delineate three key groups of factors 
originally highlighted in the South Wales study: ‘organizational’, ‘system’ and ‘oper-
ational’. It is argued that how AFR functions in practice, the ways it is used and the 
outcomes produced are shaped by interactions within and between these three core 
sets of influences.
Organizational factors are defined as the policing routines, policies, strategic choices 
and standard operating procedures that directly impact the deployment of AFR. 
System-based concerns relate more explicitly to technical aspects of AFR, including 
Table 2 Results from MPS deployments from 28 June 2018 to 14 February 2019
Event Date Watchlist size Alerts Number of AFR 
matches deemed 
credible by human 
observers (%)
Number of total 
matches proved  
correct after subject 
ID checks (%)
Stratford (1) 28 June 2018 489 4 4 (100%) 0 (0%)
Stratford (2) 26 July 2018 306 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Soho (1) 17 December 2018 2,226 5 3 (60%) 1 (20%)
Soho (2) 18 December 2018 2,226 9 3 (33%) 1 (11%)
Romford (1) 31 January 2019 2,401 9 7 (78%) 4 (44%)
Romford (2) 14 February 2019 1,996 15 9 (60%) 3 (20%)
9This does not mean that the computer is always incorrect on other occasions. For example, if an individual is matched yet 
becomes lost in the crowd or if a possible match is judged incorrect by a human operator, it remains possible that the computer 
made a correct match. However, because the identity of matched individuals are not checked, it cannot be known if the judge-
ment was correct (hence ‘not verifiably correct’).
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hardware and software issues, such as: the specific facial recognition algorithms; set-
ting parameters for how the technology operates and constructing ‘watchlist’ data-
bases of ‘suspects’’ images for the camera technology to scan. Operational factors cover 
human–machine interactions shaping how the outcomes of AFR are produced and 
used. Of particular salience are officer judgements about the credibility of algorith-
mically suggested suspect identities and types of human deference to computational 
outputs. Analysis of the role of discretion active in each of these three spheres of action 
elucidates the myriad ways suspicion becomes parameterized and primed through the 
use of digital facial recognition technology.
Organizational Factors
An immediate result of adopting researching contrasting deployments in two police 
force areas is the clarity it brings about how distinctive forces implement AFR differ-
ently. Key systems and processes across SWP and the MPS were significantly different 
from each other. Thus, organisational decisions and choices shaped the outcomes of 
the AFR technology. Among these were active selections regarding where and when 
to deploy cameras and the extent to which their presence was signalled to the public. 
Often such decisions were based on the availability of large numbers of people on 
which to test the technology and police ‘beliefs’ that multiple ‘suspected’ individuals 
are likely to be present. Such considerations were germane to the uses of AFR at the 
Notting Hill Carnival in London (twice, in 2016 and 2017) and the UEFA Champions 
League Final in Cardiff (2017).
At a more granular level, decisions about the specific positioning of cameras sig-
nificantly influenced any outcomes generated, including: the ideal location for street-
based intervention teams; risks to the public; risks to police and, ultimately, judgements 
over optimizing AFR performance. For example, in London, local intelligence brief-
ings were used to justify the selection of Stratford as a site for one AFR trial. Borough-
level crime statistics attributing it the fourth highest rate of violence and fifth highest 
rate of robbery in London seemed to support this decision. Yet, the actual positioning 
of cameras, at Westfield shopping mall, almost half a mile away from the highest crime 
‘hotspot’, was in part motivated by environmental factors that eased the temporary in-
stallation of AFR technology.10 At other sites, such as MPS operations in Romford in 
2019, preference was given to a place allowing optimal positioning of on-the-ground 
intervention teams (to increase their chances of intercepting subjects matched by the 
AFR technology) rather than the location with highest concentrations of offences. 
Thus, the arraying of physical bodies in relation to the aptitude and affordances of 
AFR technology took primacy over the optimizing of policing aims.
In South Wales, decisions over deployment locations were informed by intelligence, 
as well as strategic decisions relating to numbers of physical bodies. For example, the 
positioning of a van at the Principality Stadium during large sporting events was an 
obvious choice as it both guaranteed large numbers of people passing the cameras and 
offered a promising location for apprehending ticket touts and ‘known’ troublemakers. 
Similarly, the main shopping street in Cardiff also promised heavy footfall, including 
10Notes from observation of police planning meeting, 23 July 2018.
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people from across the whole force area. Situational factors that arose while ‘on loca-
tion’ nonetheless had to be managed appropriately. For instance, flag sellers also op-
erate for sporting events in Cardiff and the following field note excerpt illuminates how 
such exogenous environmental factors impact the implementation of AFR:
A flag seller arrives on scene to set up stall. There is a large Italy flag which at times obscures the 
camera view as it waves in the wind. Operator discussion about whether to ask nearby PCSOs to inter-
vene and ask to move on. Over time, it appears the stall might be a bonus because people tend to look 
up as they approach it. (fieldnote, SWP, 31 May 2017).
Organizational considerations also had a temporal dimension. AFR deployments in 
Leicester Square, London, were justified on the grounds of addressing crime and dis-
order closely linked to the West End’s night-time economy. However, due to limita-
tions in low-light camera performance, AFR operations took place during the day. 
Such decisions drifted from their initial rooting in intelligence-based considerations to 
those predicated on affordances arising from AFR technological capabilities. Similar 
problems were observed with low-light clouded deployments in South Wales, many of 
which took place during winter evenings—such as the Autumn Internationals and Six 
Nations rugby events.
System Factors
Essential to AFR performance, and pivotal in the construction and resolution of sus-
picion, are watchlists; the database of subject images against which captured video im-
ages are compared. There has also been considerable speculation and concern over 
‘watchlist’ composition (see Information Commissioner’s Office 2019).
Bespoke watchlists were created for each deployment, with both SWP and the MPS 
investing considerable resources in constructing them. Watchlists ranged in size be-
tween 400 and 1,200 individuals in South Wales and up to 2,226 individuals in London.11 
Significantly, criteria for inclusion on watchlists is a highly discretionary practice. Both 
forces included ‘persons of interest’ in their watchlists. For SWP, this included indi-
viduals wanted on warrant or as suspects for offences, as well as potentially vulnerable 
individuals (i.e. missing persons). Some deployments focused on specific crime types.
MPS documentation included individuals as ‘wanted by police and the courts’ that 
later became refined as ‘wanted for serious violent offences’. MPS Data Protection 
Impact Assessments repeatedly referenced non-specific categories, such as: ‘[t]o sup-
port ongoing policing activity with regards to a specific problem or location’ and ‘[t]o 
assist police in identifying individuals who may be at risk or vulnerable’.12 Such broad 
categories offer significant latitude for interpretation, creating a space for officer discre-
tion with regards to who was enrolled and excluded from such databases. Confirming 
the previous assertion about the importance of organizational factors, SWP used 
colour-coded watchlists to denote the status of individuals (e.g. pink for warrants and 
11During the planning stages for one London trial, some officers expressed a desire to construct a watchlist of ‘all wanted 
people in London’. According to officers using police databases to construct these watchlists (interviewed 20 September 2018), 
this would have implicated more than 23,700 individuals. Notwithstanding debates over what was meant by ‘wanted’, it is likely 
that this approach would have failed basic human rights tests of necessity and proportionality.
12‘Data Protection Impact Assessment for the Use of Live Facial Recognition Within the MPS’, 12 December 2018, p. 2.
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amber for suspects), which were displayed within alerts to operators. Though colours 
were not offence specific, they did denote categories of suspicion and relative urgency 
for apprehension. For example, during the Champions League deployment, the ethno-
graphic data recorded operators’ concern when they could not locate a ‘red’ nominal, 
whose watchlist colour indicated risk of danger. Across both research sites, the degree 
to which individuals graded from ‘of interest’ to ‘wanted’ was not always clearly de-
fined. Thus, in an expression of techno-social integration, each algorithmically derived 
‘possible match’ reflected a more generalized sense of operator suspicion and one fur-
ther framed by the computer’s issuance of an ‘alert’ when someone resembling these 
‘suspects’ passed a camera.
The quality of input data used to configure watchlists directly influences AFR per-
formance. Yet, the quality of images inputted to the system was also crucial, as South 
Wales Police quickly learned during their initial pilots. Images used for the first deploy-
ment at the Champion’s League final varied greatly in quality. This was partly due to 
the international nature of the event but also the force’s lack of understanding around 
the importance of high-quality images. Prior to the deployment, images were sourced 
from British, Spanish and Italian police, as well as other European agencies. The ma-
jority were ‘custody’ (controlled environment) images, but they differed greatly in 
standard and resolution. In addition, images taken from other surveillance operations 
were also used for some individuals—these had no ‘quality control’ and many were 
taken under varied lighting. Because they were ‘naturalistic’ with people, sometimes 
smiling or squinting or tilting their heads at an angle, this affected the shape of their 
faces and, therefore, the algorithm’s ability to analyse them effectively. Having encoun-
tered difficulties with poor-quality source images during the Champion’s League oper-
ation, SWP initiated a major force-wide programme to enhance the quality of all their 
new custody images. Such developments reveal further affordances at play: the quality 
of source images—captured in an entirely different context and often before the pos-
sibilities of AFR had been imagined—became key to determining if a passing ‘suspect’ 
would be identified.
In the context of AFR identification, watchlists structure the police gaze, 
interjecting a technologicallyinflected element of ‘bureaucratic suspicion’. By na-
ture, in creating watchlists comprised of police-held custody images, AFR specif-
ically targets police attention towards individuals already known to the authorities 
(the ‘usual suspects’). In one SWP operation, individuals suspected by intelligence 
units of pickpocketing at live music events were included on watchlists as a preventa-
tive measure. Similarly, in Soho, London, attempts were made to enrol local ‘char-
acters’ known for engaging in antisocial behaviour into watchlists. Deployments of 
this nature highlight how suspicion can be directed and further enacted by this 
technology. AFR systems induce a technologically framed bureaucratic suspicion in 
digital policing.
Digital parameters
Multiple additional technical components shape AFR outputs and outcomes. 
Fundamentally, AFR technology is not ‘plug and play’ both in the sense that it requires 
organizations to accommodate its idiosyncrasies and also because the system itself has 
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to be adjusted and calibrated to operate effectively. Such adjustments require con-
tinued discretion to negotiate a series of competing aims.
For example, the AFR systems analysed here use an adjustable ‘similarity score’ 
ranging between 0 and 1—broadly analogous to a correlation coefficient—when 
determining whether faces constitute possible matches. In theory, the higher the simi-
larity score, the higher degree of confidence the computer ‘has’ in the match. Users 
set the threshold of similarity needed before the machine issues an alert. Over time, 
SWP raised their threshold score from 0.55 (as recommended by the commercial sup-
plier) to 0.59 (during the Six Nations rugby internationals) in order to improve results 
(the MPS used the recommended 0.55 score throughout). Adjusting the threshold is a 
deliberate intervention intended to influence the performance of AFR suspect identi-
fication in specific ways. Setting a higher threshold increases the likelihood of a com-
puter match being correct but reduces the number of overall matches made. It also 
risks incorrectly discarding more borderline cases that may be correct matches (false 
negatives). Lowering the threshold generates more possible matches but raises the 
likelihood that some of these will be inaccurate (false positives). In both force areas, 
system accuracy and the availability of resources to intercept flagged individuals were 
key considerations when deliberating over similarity score threshold levels and where 
to set these.
Paradoxically, whilst human adjustment of threshold settings shapes the operation 
of AFR, a common consequence of this decision is the ceding of human agency to 
the technology. The more the threshold increases, the more the algorithm becomes 
the decision-maker. During SWP training sessions, operators were instructed to ig-
nore similarity scores and instead focus their attention on the images presented to 
them. Despite this instruction, observational data suggested that these scores regu-
larly appeared to influence operators’ sense of suspicion when adjudicating AFR alerts. 
Another common practice was for operators to read scores aloud, noting when they 
were particularly high. In several instances in London, a high similarity score proved 
pivotal in tilting a (human) decision towards engaging with an individual matched by 
the computer, thus exerting decisive influence on the framing of suspicion.
Other technological trade-offs involved operator judgements about appropriate reso-
lution, pixilation and processing power. Images with higher resolution can be captured 
at a greater distance, enabling cameras to adopt a wider angle and, hence, analyse 
more people in each frame. However, the higher the image resolution, the harder the 
system has to work to analyse it. A similar issue affects decisions over how images were 
framed and cropped (the ‘zone of recognition’). A wider angle captured more faces 
yet required more processing power and reduced system performance, where a tightly 
cropped view reduced the numbers of faces available for processing. Configuring these 
settings, therefore, involved striking a balance between the time taken to process an 
image and the amount of a scene deemed acceptable to lose. Such decisions rendered 
some faces visible to the machine yet, in doing so, rendered others invisible.
This issue played out during the final stop of the Leicester Square deployment. An 
alert was generated as an individual passed the very bottom of the camera’s field of 
vision. A clear image of the face was displayed yet the suspect’s body was outside the 
frame, making it impossible to provide street-based officers with a meaningful descrip-
tion of his appearance beyond reference to ethnicity and hair colour. A similar problem 
was observed in Cardiff as an individual rode a bicycle down the main shopping street. 
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In the captured image, the bicycle was out of frame, meaning operators were com-
pletely unaware of the bicycle and unable to relay the full description to the inter-
vention teams, resulting in widespread confusion over how the suspect disappeared so 
quickly. While much discussion of AFR technology rightly emphasizes biometric signa-
tures of an individual’s face, intervention teams rely heavily on more traditional signals 
for identification, such as the description of a suspect’s clothing. Such considerations 
demonstrate the continually negotiated nature of such technologies, where optimal 
performance in some areas is predicated on reduced capability in others.
In Wales, this issue connected with the level of habituation users had to the AFR tech-
nology. For example, ethnographic observations revealed how, lacking familiarity with 
the system, operators reverted to what they already knew, which, in many cases, meant 
using the system in a similar way to CCTV. For example, one officer experienced in 
CCTV use zoomed the cameras out in order to capture a much wider scene, assuming 
that, because the system looked similar to CCTV, it functioned accordingly. However, be-
cause this added load to computer processors, the system then stopped detecting faces.
One notable issue concerns levels of trust and the extent to which discretionary 
agency is delegated to technology, despite awareness of potential technological limi-
tations. During the two MPS trials in Newham, London, e.g., pre-operational brief-
ings consistently highlighted a belief in the near infallibility of AFR. A representative 
quote was:
‘it is 100% effective in spotting those uploaded into the system’ (MPS Officer 28 June 2018), and ‘the 
technology is very accurate, despite misinformation’ (MPS Officer 24 July 2018).
Throughout the MPS trials, a commonly articulated and prevailing view was one of 
faith in AFR systems to enhance policing, but the challenge being in proving its worth 
externally.
Operator Factors
The final group of factors relate to the interpretations and decisions made by indi-
vidual AFR operators. AFR as a socio-technical system reformats key aspects of police 
decision-making processes and brings elements of bureaucratic suspicion to the fore. 
Potential drawbacks of this were highlighted by Matza (1969) when he noted how bur-
eaucratic suspicion has a tendency to frame persons of interest as different to others, 
regardless of any available evidence. Individuals listed on watchlists and databases are 
cast as warranting suspicion and the AFR surveillant gaze is specifically oriented towards 
them. But, in so doing, the social biases of police activity that disproportionately focuses 
on young people and members of African Caribbean and other minority ethnic groups 
(inter alia The Lammy Review 2017) are further inflected by alleged technological biases 
deriving from how technical accuracy recedes for subjects who are older, female and for 
some people of colour (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; National Institute of Standards 
and Technology 2019). As such, it has been suggested that the algorithm could be more 
likely to be incorrect and generate ‘false positives’ when ‘identifying’ people from these 
groups. Such issues notwithstanding, discretion remains a fundamental aspect of AFR 
policing and underpins the array of decisions that must be made by officers to render 
it operationalizable.
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Arguably though, the principal instance of police discretion during AFR use is in the 
moment of ‘adjudication’. When assessing the credibility of an AFR match, the related 
activities of discretion and negotiation took place across three main arenas: between 
human operators and the computer; between different operators assessing the same 
image and between system operators and street-based intervention teams.
Human–computer interaction
The potential of AFR becomes realized when computer-generated matches are resolved 
through human activity. In most instances, this either involves an initial decision to 
disregard a match or, conversely, a suspect being engaged by street-based intervention 
teams tasked with conducting additional identity checks with AFR-matched individuals. 
In practice, this ‘second stage’ of activity was an arena of contestation and negotiation.
Human operators, therefore, constitute an essential component of the AFR process 
and play the primary role in adjudication. Two officers usually carried out this role. 
Many received formal or informal training prior to deployment, and some occupied 
non-operational roles, meaning AFR was a novel experience for them. Variances in op-
erator capability were evident across both research sites and these disparities mirrored 
those encountered in other forms of biometric policework, such as that identified in 
DNA typing activities (Cole 2002).
Such considerations shaped the deference some officers gave to the algorithm and, 
conversely, why others were more sceptical of its performance. During one SWP deploy-
ment, one operator was visibly frustrated with a lack of correct alerts being generated 
in their van, while, on the same day, operators conducting surveillance elsewhere in 
the city centre had succeeded in locating and arresting multiple ‘persons of interest’. 
As a result, this operator became less trusting of alerts generated by the system. Despite 
habituation to the system, the technology thus reduced the sense of suspicion he ex-
perienced. Similarly, in London, once an AFR match had first been deemed incor-
rect by operators (on the third day observed), the overall rate of disconfirmed alerts 
increased slightly. Such incidences demonstrate the varied responses among human 
operators of AFR. However, while deference to suggestions generated by algorithmic 
decision-making was largely habitual—and with 26 of 42 computer-generated alerts 
considered suitably credible to intercept a matched individual in London—it is im-
portant to acknowledge the important role of some officers’ (techno)scepticism.
Roles and interactions between adjudicating officers undertaking this duty varied 
considerably. Sometimes, one operator would be looking for the person in the crowd 
while the other was describing them aloud from the image captured on the screen: 
operators reported using key facial features, such as eyes, nose, mouth, jawline and 
hairline to inform their decisions. While not relevant to a subject’s appearance, some 
officers also recruited background information (e.g. offence type) for their deliber-
ations. At other times, contrasting approaches occurred within the same operational 
team. In London, any disagreements over whether to launch an intervention were al-
ways resolved in the affirmative, though this was not the case during SWP deployments.
Technical difficulties sometimes limited the role of AFR. During mobile deployments 
in central London, radios continually failed to work inside the AFR van. The corollary 
effect of these network fractures is illustrated by the following field note:
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Fourth AFR match of the first Soho deployment (0.57 threshold). The officer adjudicating images at-
tempts to radio a request to intercept a suspect. Responding to failures of both the radio and mobile 
tablets he lent out of the van and tried to radio again. When this failed, he took off after the suspect 
on foot. By this time the individual had crossed almost the length of Leicester Square. Limited ad-
judication time. Decision-making was near instant. With reflection significant differences were ap-
parent between the probe and gallery images. The gallery image had moles on the suspects face, the 
probe image had none. While difficult to ascertain at first, most tellingly they had different colour 
eyes. A false positive (MPS, 17 December 2018, 14:22 pm).
Compensating for technical difficulties, therefore, not only limited AFR capability but 
also compressed the time available for discretionary adjudication. During South Wales’ 
initial deployments for the Champions League Final when the system was still being 
configured, it was slow and often produced ‘lag’. For example, 90 seconds elapsed be-
tween the camera timestamp and real alert time, ‘which was especially evident where 
a potential match was brought up by the system’ (field note, SWP, 31 May 2017). This 
relationship between different components of human-technical networks also reflects 
a critique among accounts of surveillance informed by assemblage theories rehearsed 
above: while surveillance practices involve intricate relationships between different 
forms of technology, they are not necessarily enhanced by such unions. Single points 
of failure inhibit the network and reduce overall surveillance possibilities.
Technical and environmental influences
Additional to the role of functioning and misfunctioning technology, formulations of 
suspicion were shaped by amalgams of environmental, technical and ‘human’ influ-
ences. The spatial dynamics of areas into which AFR cameras were deployed were par-
ticularly crucial in shaping the outcomes of this technology. The Stratford, London, 
deployments revealed a trade-off between the risk of losing suspects in the crowd versus 
the need to preserve sufficient time for human deliberation of AFR matches. Here, in 
one example, intervention teams were stationed close to the cameras. After a day of in-
activity, a late afternoon alert matched a female to a watchlist entry listing serious fire-
arms offences. The ensuing flurry of activity revealed that the intervening officers were 
too close to the cameras and the suspect had already merged into the adjacent busy 
shopping mall. Eventually discovered, and discounted as a false positive, this sequence 
of events demonstrates important linkages between algorithmic decision-making, po-
lice discretion and the spatial dynamics in which an intervention is performed. Spatial 
juxtapositions of cameras to intervention teams assert a significant constraint on discre-
tion and the formulation of suspicion: physical proximities compress decision-making 
and, it can be argued, invite an intervention.
Depleted human resources, specifically the limited availability of intervention teams, 
also affected the capability of AFR technology. At the October 2017 Anthony Joshua 
boxing fight in Cardiff, near simultaneous possible matches issued to different intelli-
gence units left intervention teams unavailable to deal with both. Constraints imposed 
by the available human resources to service the ‘demand’ created by the AFR system 
moderates simplistic claims that such technologies can address austerity restrictions by 
replacing policing functions.
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Other ergonomic, ‘human factor’ and, crucially, affective influences shaped AFR use. 
Significant concerns were raised in Wales over the potential for ‘face blindness’ and fa-
tigue caused by looking at faces on laptop/desktop screens for long shifts in a confined 
space. At the 2017 Champions League final, e.g., operators were observed being bored 
and frustrated as they were responding to large numbers of ‘false positives’ with low 
similarity scores. A state of ennui was also palpable during some London deployments, 
albeit for different reasons. For the most part of several AFR deployments, very little 
happened and long days of watching prosaic surveillance feeds were only occasionally 
punctuated with moments of drama. Such incidences connect with longstanding ob-
servations documenting boredom, weariness and disengagement among surveillance 
operatives (Norris and Armstrong 1999). In response, AFR alerts rapidly transform a 
setting of boredom to one of excitement. Moreover, prior states of tedium might shift 
the weight of decision-making towards the algorithm as a rare alert offers relief through 
an invitation to action.
Conclusion
Facial recognition technologies provide the capability for police to identify suspects they 
probably would not be otherwise able to. That said, numerous caveats to such claims re-
quire acknowledgement. AFR does not directly replicate extant policing approaches to 
identifying wanted individuals (who are more commonly sought by more directed and 
often covert tactics). Moreover, the evidence from across the two originating studies 
reveals the considerable investment of effort, and willingness to navigate within the 
parameters of the framework of standard police operating procedures, required to im-
plement AFR with a reasonable degree of efficacy and efficiency.
Given how it functions in support of street policing, facial recognition technolo-
gies are better understood as providing ‘assisted facial recognition’ rather than any-
thing solely ‘automated’. This is important in terms of acknowledging the complex 
socio-technical mediations that exist in operational AFR environments. The role of 
‘assistance’, rather than ‘automation’, opens a discretionary space in which agency is en-
acted and techno-social interactions become negotiated. Particularly significant here, 
therefore, are operator decision-making activities involving discretionary and suspi-
cious judgements over who should be stopped once a possible identification has been 
articulated by the algorithm. Ultimately then, this article has interrogated how techno-
logical capability is conditioned by police discretion, but police discretion itself is also 
contingent on the operational and technical environment.
The ‘discovery’ of police discretion and allied operational constructions of police 
suspicion in the 1960s was responsible for painting a more complex and nuanced set of 
relations between police behaviour and law. Multiple street-level ethnographies docu-
mented the distinction between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’. This cast police as far 
more than simple law ‘enforcers’, as active decision-makers negotiating social order and 
against whom, when and why statutory instruments would be applied or not.
In their recent judgement, the Court of Appeal articulated two concerns over ‘two 
impermissibly wide areas of discretion’ afforded to police during AFR operations: (1) 
who is included on a watchlist and (2) where systems are deployed. Both issues are il-
luminated by our analysis. However, what the court’s formulation seems to miss is that 
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discretionary decision-making infiltrates several other components of how AFR is used 
in street policing (i.e. confirming suspected matches). Thus, positioned in a more con-
ceptual register, what our analysis demonstrates is how, although officer decision-making 
in digital policing systems may be algorithmically framed, it still draws upon forms of 
discretion redolent of the working practices familiar to previous generations of police.
The assertion that police discretion persists and recurs in terms of how leading-edge 
digital technologies are operationally deployed similarly guides our attention to a more 
supple and negotiated understanding of digital policing and the contributions of tech-
nologies such as AFR. For what has been illuminated by the empirical data is a complex 
series of layered interactions between operators, organizations and technical systems. 
These are vital in shaping what systems such as AFR can and cannot do.
There is a clear analogy here with how law in policing came to be understood over 
half a century ago. AFR algorithms steer and guide officer decision-making, but they do 
not wholly determine it. The rules encoded within the algorithms are not ‘unbending’ 
and inflexible but configured and constructed via a range of policing influences. 
Officers take active decisions about inclusion criterion for watchlists and how to con-
figure the sensitivity of the system and, thus, which matches it is enabled to make or not. 
This, in turn, frames who becomes the ‘legitimate’ subjects of a reinvented and digi-
tally mediated ‘bureaucratic suspicion’. The outcomes of such interactions are myriad 
affordances shaping the operation of AFR. It is for these reasons that we prefer the term 
‘assisted’ rather than ‘automated’ facial recognition. For whilst the application of facial 
recognition technologies for verification purposes in border environments may be auto-
mated, this is not an accurate descriptor of its current functioning in street policing.
Thus, at the same time as claiming a recurrence of police discretion and suspicion, 
we are also suggesting a degree of reinvention and reconfiguration. There is a process 
of algorithmically mediated co-constitution that, in subtle ways, alters relations between 
police and their suspects. Accenting this facet of facial recognition technologies in po-
licing does not, and should not, blind us to the fact that much concern has been ex-
pressed about it. There is, however, a difference between the ‘surveillance imaginaries’ 
and the ‘surveillance actualities’ of this and other digital policing technologies. Such 
interpretations have the potential to inform a more sophisticated and supple under-
standing of the configuration of Foucauldian biopolitics and the capillaries of power/
knowledge in the information age.
Thus, in addition to making a substantive contribution to understanding AFR’s 
use in policing, we conceive of the evidence and insights presented as simultaneously 
helpful in relation to unpacking the broader domain of digital policing. Herein, we 
have explored the interactions between police operators and algorithmic processes to 
elucidate how they are mutually and recursively shaping and structuring one another. 
In much popular and political commentary on artificial intelligence and ‘big data’, 
there is a tendency for ‘algorithmic reification’ to be induced. The technologies con-
cerned are attributed an almost mystical power, derived from their capacity to ingest 
and process vast quantities of raw data beyond what would be possible for any single 
human. They are after all, as Pasquale (2015) notes, ‘black boxes’ where it is difficult 
to determine how they are arriving at their conclusions. AFR simultaneously expands 
and constrains spaces for police discretion and suspicion. These varied articulations 
challenge more deterministic readings of police technology and also the kinds of dis-
cursive frames promoted by the commercial developers and suppliers of these systems.
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